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ESTATE, TRUST, AND DECEDENT INCOME
By STANLEY L. DREXLER of the Denver Bar

Many taxpayers, for some reason, are reluctant to share their
wealth, even with their families. Many taxpayers, for the same
reason, are eager to divide their surtax brackets, especially with
their families. Trusts often permit the division of surtax brackets
to a greater degree than they require the sharing of wealth. Trusts
are, therefore, popular with many taxpayers.
That part of the subject assigned to me which deals with the
taxation of the income of trusts under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 has the familiar flavor of the historic battle of ingenuity
between taxpayer's counsel in devising, and the government in
frustrating, plans for the simultaneous eating and having of cake.
Although the tax consequences are favorable, dying evidently
is believed to involve other consequences too extreme and final ever
to become a popular means of avoiding income taxes, and, in the
sections of the 1954 code applicable to the taxation of a decedent's
post-mortem income and the income of his estate, the sovereign
presents a more benign countenance, indulging the presumption
that the death of the citizen stemmed from non-tax considerations.
The sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 dealing with
these two aspects of taxes and death are collected in Subchapter
J of Chapter I of Subtitle A and are headed "Estate, Trusts, Beneficiaries, and Decedents."
Subchapter J is one of the eighteen subchapters of Chapter I,
which is devoted to "Normal Taxes and Surtaxes." Together with
five other chapters, it comprises Subtitle A, "Income Taxes," one
of the six subtitles of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Subchapter J is divided into two parts:
Part I-Estates, Trusts and Beneficiaries
Part II-Income in Respect of Decedents
Part I is divided into six subparts:
Subpart A-General Rules for the Taxation of Trusts and
Estates
Subpart B-Trusts Which Distribute Current Income
Only
Subpart C-Estates and Trusts Which May Accumulate
Income on Which Distribute Corpus
Subpart D-Treatment of Excess Distributions of Trusts
Subpart E-Grantors and Others Treated as Substantial
Owners
Subpart F-Miscellaneous
Having created six subparts and found them good, Congress
rested and did no work on the seventh. Part II contains only two
sections and is not divided into subparts.
The number of the first section of each subpart of Part I and
of the first section of Part II, like the first number on each block
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along Fifth Avenue in New York, begins a new series of ten,
whether or not the previous subpart contains ten sections. Thus,
although there are twenty-five sections in Subchapter J, the numbers run from 641 to 692.
Part I covers roughly the same ground as Supplement E,
"Estates and Trusts," of the 1939 code, Sections 161 to 172. However, Section 165 of the 1939 code, "Employees Trusts," has been
moved over to Subchapter D of the 1954 code, "Deferred Compensation, Etc.," and Section 169 of the 1939 code, "Common Trust
Funds," is part of Subchapter H, "Banking Institutions," and
are not covered here.
The remaining sections of Supplement E emerge as Part I
after being thickly diluted with the draft prepared by the American Law Institute and greatly expanded by lifting the Clifford
regulations to the statutory level.
Part II is derived from Sections 126 and 154 of the 1939 code.
The latter, which deals with the income taxes of the Armed Forces
on death, will not be dealt with in this article.
Trusts which constitute associations taxable as corporations
are not mentioned in Subchapter J, nor were they in Supplement E.
The controlling law is found in the decisions of the courts construing the definition of a corporation carried from the 1939 to
the 1954 code without change as part of a general definitions section.
The basic concepts of the taxation of trusts and estates have
been preserved and, in fact, strengthened by the 1954 code, but
there have been major changes of organization, form, and machinery and several important changes of substance.

I
The first principle of the law pertaining to the taxation of
estate and trust income is the dual nature of a trust or estate for
tax purposes. Just as a partnership is for some purposes treated
as an aggregate and for some purposes as an entity, a trust or
an estate (which, after all, is not more than a particular kind of
trust, arising by operation of law) is for some purposes a separate
tax-paying entity and for other purposes a mere conduit for the
distribution of income and principal, or both, to its beneficiaries.
Almost all of the complications of the law pertaining to this branch
of my subject consist of little chips which come loose from the
rough edges of these two concepts when they are squeezed together
into an artificial union.
In the capacity of a trust as a separate tax-paying entity
there are no very revolutionary differences between it and an
individual taxpayer. Both are subject to taxation at the same
rates, although a trust is expressly denied the optional standard
deduction and is incapable of enjoying the tax advantages of
matrimony.
An estate has a personal exemption of $600, as under prior
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law. The 1954 code makes a new distinction, which I will discuss
later, between trusts which are required to distribute all of their
income currently, on the one hand, and estates and trusts which
may accumulate income or which distribute corpus, on the other.
Although the code does not use the terms "simple" and "complex,"
all of the explanations I have seen refer to the former as simple
and the latter as complex. Simple trusts are given a personal
exemption of $300, an increase of $200 over the former exemption
allowed to all trusts. This is to soak up small amounts of capital
gain or stock dividends which constitute additions to corpus under
local law or the trust instrument, but which are income for tax
purposes. Complex trusts retain the $100 exemption.
The moral of this chapter is pretty plain. Not so much because
of the separate personal exemptions, but because tax brackets
start again at the bottom for each separate taxpayer, use as many
separate trusts as possible. If a single instrument is used to create
trusts for several beneficiaries each having a fixed share of the
corpus, whether one or several trusts will result for tax purposes
will depend upon the intention of the grantor as evidenced by the
language used. Therefore, either use language so plain as not to
be open to debate or use separate instruments. A trustee may be
authorized to consolidate the accounting and investment treatment
of several separate trusts without thereby sacrificing their separate identity for tax purposes.
As I have said, a trust in its capacity as a separate tax-paying
entity is treated for most tax purposes the same as an individual.
Its income is not only taxed at the same rates but also determined
and computed in the same manner. With two important exceptions,
it has the same deductions as an individual. The first of those exceptions is that a trust has an unlimited deduction for amounts of
gross income paid, permanently set aside or used for charitable
purposes during the taxable year. This is not so very remarkable,
considering that the grantor could have set up a charitable trust
in the first place. To this exception there is the exception that, if
the trust is caught finagling with the grantor in what the code
calls prohibited transactions or is guilty of unreasonable accumulations of amounts set aside for charitable purposes or devotes the
contributions to earning unrelated business income, like New York
University's spaghetti factory, then the unlimited charitable contribution is lost and the trust, if guilty of prohibited transactions
or unreasonable accumulations, has the same charitable contribution deduction limit as an individual under the 1954 code. A trust
gets no deduction for contributions allocable to the production of
unrelated business income but is allowed the same deductions as an
individual in computing that income. A contribution by a trust to
the Mueller Spaghetti Company, for example, would be non-deductible, but the Spaghetti Company could deduct its contributions to
New York University.
The other distinctive deduction of a trust is the deduction for
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distributions to its beneficiaries given to effect the bifurcation of
its function between the accumulation and distribution of its income. I shall defer discussion of that deduction until the trust as
a conduit for the distribution of income has been covered.
To the extent that the income of a trust is currently distributable to its beneficiaries, the trust is treated principally as a conduit, and the tax consequences are generally the same as if the
trust had not been set up and the income distributed to the beneficiaries had been taxed directly to them in the first place without
the intervention of any trust. Of course if the trust and the beneficiary have different taxable years, there has to be a rule to permit each to cast up its accounts on the annual basis, and that rule,
as you would expect, is that the beneficiary has to include in his
taxable income the taxable income passing to him through the conduit of a trust having a taxable year ending before or simultaneously with the close of his own taxable year.
There is no special trust problem in determining when income
is earned, but the ingenuity of taxpayers in figuring out ways of
sitting on the fence until it was certain which way it would save
the most taxes to jump, has led to the development of some special
rules as to when income is considered as distributed. First, as to
trusts which are required by the terms of the trust instrument or
by local law to distribute all of their income currently, the law has
always been and still is that the entire taxable income of a taxable
year is treated as having been distributed within the taxable year
whether or not it is actually distributed. As to trusts in which it
lies within the discretion of the trustee whether income is to be
currently distributed or accumulated, the old rule was that income
which was properly paid or credited to the beneficiaries within
the tax year was treated on the conduit principle and the remaining income on the separate tax paying entity principle. Taxpayers
developed the wait-and-see habit to such an extent that the taxable year was artificially extended sixty-five days for the purpose
of deciding what distributions were to be considered as having
been made to the beneficiaries. The 1954 code, as we shall consider, has developed what was supposed to be much heavier artillery than the sixty-five-day rule to use against taxpayers who would
exploit lower brackets available to trusts for the current taxation
of incomes to be later distributed tax-free to high-bracket beneficiaries, and has no need for the sixty-five-day rule. Accordingly,
it has been abrogated, but to avoid retroactive repeal, it will still
apply to the first sixty-five days following the close of a trust's
first tax year falling under the new law, that is, a year beginning
in 1954 or later and ending after August 16, 1954. A proposed
regulation would allow an election to continue on the sixty-five-day
rule.
We have now developed our broad pattern far enough to see
that trusts are separate tax-paying entities with respect to the income which they accumulate and are conduits to the extent of their
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currently distributable income and that all income which is required to be distributed within the taxable year is treated as a current distribution taxable to the beneficiary.
A corollary of these rules is the principle that there is one
group of credits and deductions allowable to the trust by virtue
of its status as a taxpayer and which it may take even though it
distributes all of its income, and another group, such as depreciation, for example, which attach to particular sources of income and
have to be allocated between trust and beneficiary depending upon
whether, as to that particular income, the trust is treated as a
taxpayer or as a conduit.
The trust may take its personal exemption, the net-operating
loss carry-over deduction, and the unlimited deduction for charitable contribution, without regard to how it accumulates or distributes its income. Credits for partially tax exempt interest,
foreign taxes, and the new dividends-received credit available to
individuals are allowed to the trust only to the extent that they
are not properly allocable to the beneficiary. Depreciation, depletion, and amortization have to be allocated between the trust and
the beneficiary. The only one of these allocations which promises
to be troublesome is the allocation of the new $50 exclusion feature
of the dividends-received credit. This exclusion is in the nature of
an exemption and thus would seem allowable to any taxpayer who
enjoys $50 or more of dividend income. The way the law works,
however, it looks as if a trust which has $100 worth of dividend
income, of which it accumulates $50 and distributes $50 will wind
up paying tax on $50, even though it would seem that the trust in
its taxpayer role is entitled to accumulate $50 worth of dividend
income tax-free and deduct the other $50 which it currently distributes. It may be that the regulations will straighten this out,
although for reasons which will become apparent as we go along,
this would be inconsistent with the mechanism established for
gearing the income of the trust with the distributions to the beneficiaries.
Before leaving the subject of the deductions and credits available to the trust and the beneficiaries, it is appropriate to mention
that the 1954 code permits the beneficiaries succeeding to the trust's
property upon termination of the trust to avail themselves of any
unused portion of a carry-over of a net operating loss or capital
loss and any deductions except for personal exemption and charitable contributions in excess of the gross income of the trust or estate for its final year. Under former law the courts refused to allow
such substitution on the ground that the trust and its beneficiaries
were different taxpayers.
Our pattern now shapes up like this: To the extent of its
current income accumulations, a trust is a separte taxpayer with
the usual deductions and credit. To the extent of current income
required to be distributed, a trust is a conduit, transmitting income and those special credits and deductions attributable to the
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income transmitted. Unused deductions are transmitted to the
beneficiaries upon termination of the trust.
Another corollary of these principles implicit in what I have
already said is that income passing through the conduit is unchanged in character in the hands of the beneficiaries. Capital
gains remain capital gains; exempt interest is not made taxable
by passing through a trust, and so on.
II
The next principle which I will discuss is that income of a
trust or estate transmitted to beneficiaries whether currently or
ultimately is generally subject to only one tax. If it is taxed to the
trust because it is accumulated, it is then set up for tax-free distribution to the beneficiary upon termination of the trust. If it
passes through the conduit of the trust as currently distributable
income, it is taxable to the beneficiary and not to the trust. Congress, however, has fouled up the beautiful symmetry and simplicity of this pattern by a rather complicated throwback rule designed to frustrate well-laid plans to distribute lightly-taxed trust
accumulations to high-bracket beneficiaries free of a second tax
bite. As I shall show, his throwback rule may throwbackfire on the
Treasury.
I can't hope to explain the throwback rule without first discussing the mechanism which the 1954 code employs for gearing
the deduction allowed to the trust for distributions to its beneficiaries with the income that is taxable to the beneficiaries and
showing how it operates, year by year, both in the case of what
everybody except Congress calls simple trusts and in the case of
what everybody but Congress terms complex trusts.
The need for such a mechanism grew out of cases like Johnston v. Helvering 1 and McCullough v. Commissioner,2 which pointed
up the ineptness of the 1939 code in finding a technique of treating the trust as a conduit. The 1939 code sought to accomplish
this by simply allowing to the trust a deduction for net income
currently distributable or distributed to beneficiaries. In Johnston
v. Helvering, this resulted in the beneficiary's paying a tax on the
proceeds of a mortgage salvage operation regarded as income by
local law in a year where the trust suffered a loss, and in McCullough v. Commissioner, a non-taxable stock dividend was taxed to
the beneficiary because the trust instrument decreed its distribution as income. The 1954 code prevents the occurrence of this kind
of thing by a mechanism analogous to that employed in the area
of rptermining the tyable nature of corporate distributions, that
is, by first setting up a yardstick of taxable distributions. In the
dividend field, the mechanism is the concept of accumulated earn'Johnston v.
715.

Helvering, 141 F. (2d)

2 McCullough v. Commissioner, 153 F.

208 (2nd Cir. 1944), cert. den. 323 U. S.
(2d) 345 (2nd Cir. 1946).
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ings and profits. In the trust field, the mechanism is the concept of
distributable net income.
Distributable net income is obtained, by doing a number of
esoteric things to taxable income. Once obtained, it serves as a
measure and a ceiling both of the deduction allowed to the trust
for distributions and the income taxable to the beneficiaries by
reason of those distributions. Since taxable income of the trust
is the starting point in the computation of distributable net income
and since all of the deductions of trust have already been taken out
and only the personal exemption is added back (this I can understand), the result is that the beneficiaries participate in the
trust's deductions even though the trust distributes all of its
income. Under the 1939 code the trust's deduction for trustee's
commissions would be lost if the trust distributed all of its income.
Under the scheme of the 1954 code, this deduction goes to reduce
the trust's income and thus reduces the amount upon which the
beneficiaries are taxable. The operation of this mechanism differs
somewhat in simple and complex trusts, and, although I have been
tossing those terms around, I have not yet defined them.
A simple trust is one in which all of the current income, and
only the current income, is directed to be currently distributed.
This does not mean that a simple trust cannot, by definition, accumulate taxable income. The simple trust is permitted, either by
the express terms or the necessary implications of the code provisions, to exclude from what is to be currently distributed to the
beneficiaries such items as capital gains, stock dividends, and extraordinary dividends, and to provide for depreciation at a faster
rate than that allowable for tax purposes. All that is apparently
required for qualification as a simple trust is that all of the income,
as that term is used in the trust instrument and under applicable
local law, be currently distributable and that the trustee act in
good faith under the instrument and local law in making allocations to corpus of items which are income for tax purposes. Thus,
a simple trust with a built-in $300 per year accumulation feature
would be an easy way to accumulate a nest egg tax-free for each
of a high bracket taxpayer's numerous grandchildren. The fact
that the trust also provides for corpus distribution does not disqualify it as a simple trust for years in which no such distribution
is made nor does it lose the trust the $300 exemption even in such
a year. However, since the code requires that a simple trust distribute current income only, the simplified treatment is not available in a year, such as, for example, the year of termination, in
which there is corpus distribution. A simple trust may be intervivos or testamentary, but an estate in administration is expressly
disqualified for treatment as a simple trust.
By elimination, estates and all other trusts are treated as
complex trusts. The first big additional problem which we face
when we come to estates and complex trusts is that we are frequently dealing with the distribution of corpus as well as of income,
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sometimes to the same and sometimes to different sets of beneficiaries. Gifts and bequests of property, as distinguished from
gifts and bequests of income, are received tax-free by the beneficiaries.
Any amount properly paid or credited under the terms of the
will or trust as a bequest or gift of a specific sum of money or
specific property, either all at once or in not more than three installments, is treated as bequest or gift of property for this purpose. A gift or bequest which can be paid only out of income is
not excluded. An annuity which is to be paid out of income, if
possible, and out of corpus, if necessary, is treated as a current
income distribution to the extent actually satisfied out of current
income.
The deduction of the complex trust or estate for distributions
to its beneficiaries is the sum of the amounts required to be currently distributed plus any portion of an annuity payable out of
income or corpus which is actually paid out of current income, and
all other amounts properly paid, credited, or required to be distributed during the taxable year, whether income or corpus, up to
the ceiling of distributable net income.
Here the analogy to accumulated earnings and profits again
becomes apt. I like to think of earnings and profits as a liquid of
heavier specific gravity which sinks to the bottom of a vessel where
there is a spigot that is turned on when corporate distributions are
drawn off. As long as there are corporate earnings and profits
there is no way, short of cracking open the vessel at the top by a
partial liquidation or breaking it up by complete liquidation, of
drawing off distributions from any other source.
So it is with a complex trust having some beneficiaries to whom
current income distributions are required to be made and some
beneficiaries who receive distributions which may be from noncurrent sources, whether income accumulated from past years or
corpus. The members of the second class are the first-class citizens
tax-wise, and the first class is distinctly second class tax-wise. To
the extent of the available net distributable income the first group
must include in their gross income all distributions required to be
made to them. They have no way of drawing off the liquid from
the tax-free top. The others (who may or may not be the same
persons), the elite group, need include in their gross income only
their share of the distributable net income remaining after the
untouchables have soaked up the nasty, dirty taxable liquid. Furthermore, the elite class may deduct specifically non-taxable gifts
and bequests paid out of eornu.
There is, however, left even to the untouchables the protection
of the so-called character rule that income retains in the hands of
the beneficiaries its character as capital gain, partially exempt, or
wholly exempt income and the specific provisions allocating to
particular classes of income particular kinds of deductions ap-
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plicable therein, such as depreciation. In the absence of a direction
by the grantor or testator, beneficiaries participate ratably in all
classes of trust income and would share the benefit of the character
rule and the allocation provisions in the same ratable manner.
III
In the cases with which we have been dealing so far, we have
generally assumed that distributable net income was less than the
amount distributed. What happens when the trust distributes
more income than its current income out of income which it has
accumulated in the past? Going back to our pattern, if this income
has already been subject to taxation in the hands of the trust, it
should not again be taxed when distributed to the beneficiary. But
the 1954 code may spoil that pattern by requiring a throwback. A
throwback has no connection with a fullback, but it is a kind of
reverse forward pass. Before there can be a throwback there must
be what the code calls an accumulation distribution, that is, a distribution in excess of distributable net income for that year. Even
though there is an accumulation distribution, there is no throwback
unless some other tests are met. First there are knocked out of
the excess of distribution over distributable net income (1) any
distributions accumulated before the birth of the beneficiary or
before his attaining the age of 21, (2) distributions made to meet
the beneficiary's emergency needs, (3) distributions not more than
four in number spaced not more closely than four years between
any two and required by a trust instrument in existence on January 1, 1954, upon a beneficiary's attaining specified ages, and
(4) a final distribution of a trust made more than nine years
after the last transfer to the trust. If the excess distributions
exceed these four items by more than $2,000, there is an accumulation distribution as to the entire excess. If the excess distributions do not exceed the sum of these four items plus $2,000, there
is no accumulation distribution and there can be no throwback.
If there is an accumulation distribution, then it is carried
back, a year at a time, and applied against undistributed net income, that is, the deficiency of distributions compared with the
sum of taxes of the trust and its distributable net income. The
unabsorbed portion of the accumulation distribution, if any, is
carried back again to the next preceding year, and this process is
continued until the entire accumulation distribution is absorbed or
until five years have been searched.
The amount reallocated to any year by this process is treated
as a constructive distribution by the trust for that year. The beneficiaries do not, however, file amended returns for that year, nor
does the trust receive a refund or credit of its taxes paid in the
year of reallocation. Instead, the beneficiaries include in their
income for the current year their share of the constructive distribution for the year of reallocation. In amount and character the
constructive distributions are included in the beneficiaries' cur-
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rent income only as they would have been includable had they
actually been made in the year of constructive distribution. Thus,
if the income of the trust in the year to which the throwback pertains was 50 per cent non-taxable, the income included in the year
in which the throwback originates is likewise 50 per cent nontaxable. The taxes of a particular beneficiary resulting from a
throwback cannot exceed the taxes which he would have paid had
the income constructively distributed been actually distributed to
him in the years to which the throwback applies. Thus additional
taxes are includable at the lower of (1) the effective tax rates on
the current year, or (2) the aggregate of the former years.
The trust's taxes for the former year or years, instead of being refunded or credited to the trust, are credited to the extent
of the overpayment resulting from the reallocation pro rata among
the beneficiaries who bear the burden of the reallocation. These
credits may be used in payment of the beneficiary's tax liabilities
for the year in which the throwback originates, not only against
the additional taxes resulting from the throwback, but against any
other tax liability of the beneficiary for that year. I foresee still
more social security for accountants in making the necessary computations. I also forsee some pretty bizarre possibilities. I shall
use the illustration appearing at pages 1621 to 1622 of the 1954
Revenue Act Coordinator prepared by the Research Institute of
America.
The trust and the beneficiaries report on the cash and calendar year basis. The trust derives all of its income from taxable interest. For 1955, 1956 and 1957 its net income was $30,000, $10,000
and $20,000 respectively. The trustee must distribute one-half of
the income currently to A, and in his discretion may pay out of
income or corpus (not for emergency or other excepted purpose)
to B or C, or both, amounts totalling not more than $15,000 in
any one year.
A received $15,000, $5,000 and $10,000 in 1955, 1956, and 1957,
respectively. B received nothing in 1955, $5,000 in 1956, and $9,000
in 1957. C received nothing in 1955 or 1956, and $6,000 in 1957.
Since A is not affected, the illustration deals only with B and C
who are single and without dependents. In 1957, neither has income except from the trust. In 1955, B has outside taxable income
of $5,000; C has none. The 1954 tax rates are assumed to continue.
In 1957 the trust has a distributable net income of $20,000.
After the mandatory distribution of $10,000 to A, there is $10,000
left. B and C receive a total of $15,000, so there is an accumulation
distributution of $5,000. This is first thrown back to 1956, but
there is not undistributed net income. in 1955, however, the trust
had $10,317 of undistributed income after its distribution to A and
its tax of $4,683. Reallocation results in constructive distributions
of $4,362 to B and $2,908 to C. B's tax, if the constructive distribution had been made in 1955, is lower than the increase resulting
from adding it to 1957, and so he pays the lower figure, which is
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$1,090, plus his 1957 tax on his other income of $1,048, or a total of
$2,138. C is also better off with a 1955 constructive distribution of
$404 as against a $640 1957 increase. C's tax for 1957 on his regular income not attributable to the throwback is $620. The total
with the tax computed on a 1955 basis is $1,024 for C. The trust's
tax overpayment of $2,834 is allocated 9/15 ($1,700) to B and 6/15
($1,134) to C. B's tax for 1957 after the credit is $438, or $610
less than it would have been had he not been the victim of the
throwback, and C, who would have paid $620 in 1957 but for the
throwback, pays nothing. If C had received a distribution of only
$4,000 in 1957, he still would have had a tax of $620 to pay. However, since he actually received $6,000, he has no tax to pay.
Before I leave this phase of my subject, I would like to try to
complete the broad pattern which I started.
Trusts (and estates, which are a special kind of trust) are
separate taxpayers. They are also conduits for the distribution of
income. To the extent that they are not mere conflicts, they are
taxable at the same rates as individuals, their income is determined
in the same manner, and they have largely the same ldnd of credits
and deductions. They have a special unlimited charitable deduction
which may be lost by prohibited transactions, unreasonable accumulations, or unrelated business income. The extent to which trusts
serve as mere conduits is determined by a special kind of deduction
for their distributions to their beneficiaries. While technically all
income is taxable to the trust and distributions deductible by the
trust, the trust's distributive deduction and the beneficiary's taxable distribution are so geared together as to strengthen the conduit
principle. This is accomplished by a concept of distributable net
income which serves as a measure of both. It consists of the trust's
taxable income with certain adjustments. It accordingly precludes
taxation to the beneficiaries of items which are not part of the
trust's taxable income. Certain deductions and credits peculiar to
certain classes of income are allocated between trust and beneficiary as that income is distributed or accumulated. Others are
available to the trust in any event. Unused deductions and credits
are transferred to the beneficiaries on the termination of the trust.
The new code provides that income of the trust retains its character in the hands of the beneficiaries. Trusts which are required to
distribute currently all of their income and which distribute only
income, commonly known as simple trusts, are given a simpler
treatment in the code than estates and other trusts. Such trusts
have a personal exemption of $300. Other trusts have a $100 personal exemption. Estates have a $600 exemption. A simple trust
retains its exemption even in a year of corpus distributions. In
estates and complex trusts, distributable net income is first attributed to income beneficiaries who are entitled to receive current
income distributions and then the remainder to other beneficiaries.
Gifts and bequests of specific property are transmitted by the trust
tax-free to the beneficiaries. In the absence of specific direction
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in the trust instrument, a ratable portion of all classes of income
are distributed to all beneficiaries. A new five-year throwback rule
designed to recoup taxes saved through accumulation by trusts at
low tax rates and distributing to the beneficiary in his low tax
years is a feature of the code, and it may backfire or produce
strange results in some cases.
IV
Subpart E of Subsection J deals with the taxation of the income of trusts to the grantor or some other person as substantial
owner.
In a series of decisions in 1940, the United States Supreme
Court greatly extended the sweep of Section 22(a) of the 1939
internal revenue code defining gross income in broad terms of
gains, profits and income from any source whatever. These decisions
included Helvering v. Clifford,3 taxing to the grantor the income
of a trust for a five-year term, with a reversion to the grantor, and
the grantor aa trustee having the power to distribute or accumulate
income in his discretion and broad powers of management. The
beneficiary was the wife of the grantor. They also included Helvering v. Horst 4 and Helvering v. Eubank,5 taxing to the assignor
income to which he had a fixed right and which he attmepted to
assign to another. These cases were foreshadowed by Lucas v.
Earl.6
The Clifford case spawned what I believe may well constitute
the largest body of decisions on any point of tax law and which is
very respectable by comparison with the volume of cases on any
other narrow point of law, tax or non-tax. Erudite articles have
been written as to whether any of the factors of the Clifford case
standing alone-shortness of term, grantor as trustee with power
to determine whether income should be distributed or accumulated,
breadth of administrative powers of the trustee, relationship of
husband and wife between grantor and beneficiary-would be
enough to invoke the doctrine of the case, and whether or not the
approach was in terms of examining broadly the whole bundle of
rights.
Late in 1945 the Treasury issued, and in 1947 substantially
modified, the so-called Clifford regulations which attempted to introduce some order and definiteness into what had become an extremely complicated situation. Most of the cases had emphasized
the necessity of examining each case in the light of all of the surrounding facts, with no one factor being controlling. The regulations specified numerous factors, any one of which caused the
income of the trust to be taxable to the grantor. The regulations
'309
S331
'331
-281

U.
U.
U.
U.

S.
S.
S.
S.

331
112
122
111

(1940).
(1940).
(1940).
(1930).
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provided, for example, that the fact that the trust was for a shorter
period than ten years was standing alone enough to condemn the
trust. These regulations received mixed treatment by the courts,
and they did, almost admittedly, represent legislation by regulation. The most significant thing about the treatment of the Clifford
principle in the 1954 code is the very fact that the regulations are
now law, rather than any of the relatively, minor modifications of
the regulations.
The ten year minimum term has been adopted. In the regulations a term between ten and fifteen years was also suspect, provided other factors of control were present. This has been dropped.
The code introduces a new two-year charitable trust. Although the
grantor's revisionary interest in such a short term trust is probably
too great to permit a charitable contribution deduction for the value
of the property contributed, many taxpayers may be interested
in such an arrangement, which permits the devotion of particular
property to charitable use and gets the income clear out of the
grantor's returns for that period at the price a very short-term
commitment.
The regulations and the code treat the grantor as the continued
owner where he reserves the power to control beneficial enjoyment
by shuffling the income among beneficiaries of his choice. The code
makes this power more restrictive by reserving such spray provisions to an independent trustee rather than a close relative,
whether or not there is a resonably definite external standard.
Under the regulations a spouse was barred from exercising such
a spray power. The code in one breath relaxes this rule by allowing a spouse to serve if not subservient to the wishes of the grantor
and then tightens it up by presuming the spouse to be subservient
and requiring proof by the preponderance of the evidence in the
case of the non-subservient spouse.
The power of the grantor to borrow from the trust without
adequate interest or security has been made less sure-death by a
provision that this is all right, if the trustee, provided he is not
the grantor, has a similar power with respect to any person. As a
trustee the grantor is permitted to hold and vote stock owned by
the trust and direct the investment of trust funds. As grantor in
a non-fiduciary capacity, he may do so only if the holdings of the
trust and his own holdings are not significant from the standpoint
of voting control.
In addition to the situations covered by the Clifford regulations, the grantor is taxable on the trust income in the situations,
with a few minor modifications, covered by sections 166 and 167
of the 1939 code.
A power to revoke thus continues to cause the trust income
to be taxable to the grantor. The new code provides that if such
power will not arise for ten years the trust is recognized until then
but becomes invalid then unless the power is renounced.
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Income which may be distributed to the grantor, held or accumulated for the benefit of the grantor, or used to pay premiums
on an insurance policy on his life continues to be taxable to the
grantor, as under present law. There is no reason to think that the
line of decisions restricting the sweep of the provisions with regard
to insurance premiums to premiums on policies actually in force
during the taxable year does not apply to the new language, which
is substantially the same as the old. In view of the estate tax provisions abrogating the premium payment test with respect to the
includability of proceeds of policies owned by some one else on the
life of insured, it may be questioned whether or not the continuation of this income tax provision is consistent with the philosophy
expressed in the new code.
Income from trusts for the support of dependents of the
grantor continues to be taxable to the grantor to the extent that
current income is actually so applied.
A beneficiary or other person than the grantor having the
power to vest the corpus or income of a trust in himself is taxed
as substantial owner unless he renounces the power within a reasonable time after learning of its existence and unless the grantor is
taxable on the income. Although the 1954 code contains no provisions dealing with the reciprocal trust situation or the case of a
nominal grantor, there is no reason to believe that the authority of
existing court decisions has been weakened.
The income of alimony trusts continues to be taxable to the
divorced wife as under present law, and she need be only separated under a written separation agreement rather than divorced
or legally separated, as under present law. This conforms the law
of alimony trusts to the changes made in the deductions and taxable
income sections of the new code, assimilating the tax status of
payments made under a written separation agreement to payments
made under a decree of divorce or separte maintenance.
Prior to the enactment of the revenue act of 1942, income of
a decedent was accrued in his final return. This led to a bunching
of income. The 1942 act corrected this inequitable situation by
permitting the estate or beneficiary to receive the income to which
the decedent was entitled with the same tax consequences as would
have ensued had the decedent lived to receive it. The 1954 code
extends this treatment one step further. Under the former law the
income entitled to be received derivatively by the beneficiary would
be bunched in the beneficiary's final return in the event of the beneficiary's death. The '54 code corrects this situation and avoids a
bhing
of income taxes in the final return of.a..
.wio
who was
receiving, for example, royalties from a book written by her deceased husband. These would now be taxed to the children as received, and presumably to the grandchildren on the death of the
children.
Under the 1939 code the death of the obligee of installment
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obligations precipitated the tax due on the value of the obligations
unless a bond was filed conditioned upon the payment of taxes on
the installment payments. This requirement is eliminated under
the '54 code. The excess of the face value of the obligations over
basis to the decendent is treated as an income item transmitted on
death and is taxable to the estate or beneficiary when realized.
Under prior law the estate or beneficiary of a decedent could
deduct for income tax purposes a proportionate part of the estate
tax only if the income right originated with the decedent. This
role has been changed to conform with the possibility of successive
transmissions. The deduction of estate tax for income tax purposes
formerly belonged to the estate. It now belongs to the beneficiary
if the income right upon which the deduction is based has been distributed or is distributable to the beneficiary.
The deductible estate tax depends upon the aggregate value of
all postmortem rights. A surviving annuitant under a joint and
survivor annuity is expressly granted this deduction of estate tax
paid on the transmitted income right. The value of the right for
estate tax purposes is computed by determining the excess of the
value of the annuity at the date of death over the amount excludible
from the survivor's gross income during his life expectancy and
multiplying this by the ratio of the estate tax and date of death
valuations of the annuity. Since the decedent may have paid part
of the cost, these figures may differ.
Most of the changes we have discussed are in the direction of
better draftsmanship and organization and represent, for the most
part, desirable changes substantively. There are, however, complications remaining in the new code, particularly as to the new
provisions regarding complex trusts and estates and the throwback.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, although it is an enormously
impressive task and represents an infinite improvement over the
1939 code in the field we have been considering, looks as if it still
will require some further overhauling in the light of operating
experience.
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